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The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1656

PEIPING, August 2, 1932.
(Received August 29.)

SIR: "ith reference to my telegram No. 882 of August 1, 9 (3) p.m., I have the honor to enclose herewith in confidence a copy of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Commission of Study of the League of Nations now investigating the causes of trouble between Japan and China by the Japanese assessor, which encloses an epitomized record of the statements which Count Uchida made at the interviews with that Commission in Dairen and Tokyo. I was permitted to make copies of this document for my confidential information, and I have the honor to request that the Department treat the document as confidential.

As stated in my telegram, my information is that while this document does not accurately set forth all that Count Uchida said to the Commission while it was in Tokyo, it is nevertheless believed to be a clear and accurate statement of the policy which Count Uchida as Minister of Foreign Affairs will follow in dealing with the Manchurian situation.

Respectfully yours,

NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON

(Enclosure)

Epitomized Record of Statements Made by Count Uchida at
Interviews With the League of Nations Commission in Dairen
and Tokyo

1. Some time ago at Dairen I had occasion to state frankly to Your Excellencies my personal views based upon my experience in connection with Manchuria, acquired in varied capacities during the past quarter of a century. To-day as Minister for Foreign Affairs I can discover no ground whatsoever for modifying those views on any essential point.

2. All the international disputes which have occurred in recent years in the Far East may be chiefly attributed in the first place to the fact that China is disunited and destitute of control does not, taken as a whole, constitute a duly organized state, and in the second place to the revolutionary foreign policy of the Nationalist Government, strongly influenced as it is by communist doctrine imported from abroad. And it is not Japan alone, but all the Powers which

possess important interests in China, that must suffer from such state of affairs now existing in China.

3. Unfortunately extreme difficulties are encountered in any attempt to repair the injuries thus sustained by the various Powers, through any appeal to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty, the Anti-War Pact, or any other existing treaty intended for the maintenance of international peace. In fact, it has been the practice among the principal Powers to rely upon their own resources whenever their rights and interests in China were actually, or were in danger of being, seriously impaired. The recent history of China is full of examples of such cases, in which reparation for, or the prevention of, damage to their interests was effectuated by foreign Powers upon their own account.

4. Japan, as a country more intimately connected with China both historically and geographically, than any other, and possessing by far the greatest interests in China, has had to suffer more than other countries from the anomalous situation in China as I described above. As far as Japan was concerned, she naturally hoped to see China experience a re-birth and come to realize her true role in maintaining the peace of the Far East. For more than twenty years, especially as a sequel to the Conference of Washington, we have exercised the greatest patience and self-control, but conditions in China have failed to show any trace of improvement; on the contrary, they grew notably worse. It was at a moment when the feeling of our people was running high in face of the ever increasing Chinese provocations, that in Manchuria, Japan's first bulwark, where, staking the fortunes of our country, we fought two great wars with China and with Russia in order to repel their aggressions and, where our country's vital interests on the Continent of Asia are centered, the sudden incident of September 1st occurred. We had no other course than to take decisive measures of self-defence.

5. As a consequence of Japan's action, the power of General Chang Hsueh-liang in Manchuria was extinguished. Influential people of Manchuria, who had long chafed under the misrule of the Changs and were opposed to their policy of dragging Manchuria into the turmoil of Chinese civil war south of the Great Wall, seized the opportunity to set up an independent state.

Manchuria is a country quite apart from China Proper, geographically and in psychological characteristics. The population, though mostly of Chinese origin is composed largely of those Chinese who, driven out of their homes in China Proper by famine and flood, by tyranny and oppression, fled to Manchuria seeking to start a new life in that land where they could enjoy comparative security and abundance owing to Japan's vigilance and enterprise. Moreover, historically viewed, Manchuria has never constituted a purely integral part of China. Especially during recent decades has it been demonstrated on innumerable occasions that the authority of no government in China Proper extended to Manchuria.

The founding of Manchukuo was only an outcome of the subterranean revolutionary movement of many years' standing, which has opened to come to the surface as a sequel to Japan's actions of self-defence, and which proved successful owing to the peculiar characteristics which separate Manchuria from China Proper. The independence of Manchuria should therefore, be regarded as essentially a phenomenon the political disintegration in China.

6. There may be more than one plan for the solution of the Manchurian problem. The Japanese Government believe that the problem should be solved with the aim in view of ensuring the security and stability of Manchuria as well as the permanent peace of the Far East, and that at all events the mistake should not be made of rendering the situation uncertain and so perpetuating occasions for future disputes. It would be intolerable if, as the result of any temporizing measure of expediency or compromise, there should be resuscitated in Manchuria conditions analogous to those that prevailed there prior to the incident of 18th September last. In that sense I cannot agree to any plan which would contemplate the inauguration of the rule of an anti-Japanese and disorganized China over Manchuria. Moreover, the authorities of Manchukuo, who have repeatedly declared their intention completely to separate themselves from the corrupt and foul politics of China Proper and to set up an honest and able government, would not consent to a plan which would utterly defeat their ideal and aspirations.

I believe that any plan which might be formulated, in which no account is taken of the existence of Manchukuo as an international state, will fail to bring order and stability to Manchuria and tranquility to the Far East.

7. The recognition of a new state or government is not a matter for the exercise of the choice or fancy of other states. It is a step imposed upon them by the necessities of international intercourse. It is rightly felt intolerable that a country should be compelled for any length of time to regard the government which actually controls its nearest neighbor as devoid of all substantial authority and title, and as incompetent to represent it abroad. As Manchukuo is the outcome of a local movement of self-determination on the part of the inhabitants, who have undoubtedly been much oppressed in the past, as above observed, there can be no question, in recognizing its existence, of any inconsistency with the Nine Power Treaty of Washington whose provisions Japan is most anxious to observe. The object of the Treaty was not to exempt that region from the usual and normal operation of the law of nations which legitimizes de facto governments, nor to perpetuate and integrity of discord. It would be directly contrary to its terms to hold that China must forever seethe in anarchy and that no part of the ancient Chinese territory can ever be allowed to erect itself as an island of peace and security, but must be forced down into the morass of discord and disorganization by eight civilized Powers. In short, the Nine Power Treaty does not forbid Chinese in any part of China to establish of their own free will an independent state, and it does not, therefore, constitute a

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violation of the Treaty to accord recognition to a new state so founded. There is no doubt that Manchukuo, if given fair and untrammelled opportunity by Japan and other Powers, will quickly develop into a strong and stable nation, and so given a much needed lead to the establishment of a strong and stable government in China.

辯護側書證一二九

日米外交關係第一卷九五頁ヨリ九八頁一九三一年ヨリ一九四二マデノ拔萃
ワシントン國務省

七九三、九四 命令 三三八

駐中國大使（ジョンソン）ヨリ國務長官宛

第一六五六號 一九三二年八月二日北京發信

（八月二十九日受領）

八月一日午後九時（八時）發小官ノ第八八三號電報ニ開シ小官ハ日本中國間の紛議ノ原因ヲ檢討シツ、アル國際聯盟研究委員會ノ議長ニ日本側出席者ガ宛テタ手紙ノ寫シヲココニ秘密ニ同封申シ上ゲマハ。コノ手紙ハ、内田伯爵ガ東京及ビ大連ニ於ケル同委員會トノ會見デ行ツタ時明ノ摘要ヲ記錄シテキマス。コノ書類ノ寫シハ小官ノ極秘情報トシテ製作スルコトヲ許サレタモノデアリ、國務省營局デモコレラ秘密書類トシテオ取扱ヒ下サルヨウオ願ヒ致シマス

小官ノ電報中ニアル如ク、コノ書類ハ、同委員會ガ東京訪問ノ際内田伯

ノ述ベタコトノ總ベテヲ明確ニ發表シテハ居リマセヌガ、ソレニモ拘ハラズコレガ内田伯ガ外務大臣トシテ滿洲問題ノ處理ニ採ルベキ政策ヲ明白、確實ニ陳述シテキルモノデアルト信ジラレテキルトノ報道ヲ小官ハ得テ居リマス。

敬　具

ネルソン・トラスラー・ジョンソン

(別紙)

大連及東京ニ於イテ内田伯ガ日聯盟委員會トノ會見ニオイテナセル聟明ノ摘要記錄

一先般私ハ、過去二十五年間諸々ノ職掌ヲ以テ私ガ滿洲國ニ關シテ得タ經驗ニ基ク私ノ個人的意見ヲ御一統ニ卒直ニ述ベル機會ヲ得マシタ。今日外務大臣トシテ私ハ基本的ニハドノ點ニツイテモソノ意見ヲ修正すべき何ラノ理由モ見出シ得マゼン。

二近年極東ニオイテ起ツタ國際紛議ノ主ナル原因ハ第一ニ、中國ガ四分五裂ノ狀態デ全ク統率ヲ缺キ、全體トシテ適當ニ組織サレタ國家ヲナシテヰナイ事實ト、第二ニ、外國カラ輸入シタ共產主義ニ強ク影響サレテヰル國民黨政府ノ革命的ナ外交政策ニアルト云ヘマセウ。ソシテ中國ニ現存スルカ、ル事態ニヨリ迷惑ヲ蒙ルノハタゞ日本ノミナラズ中國ニ對シ重要ナル權益ヲ有スル總テノ國家デアリマス

三國際聯盟規約九ヶ國條約、不戰條約ソノ他國際間ノ平和ヲ保持スルタメノ何ラカ條約ヲ通ジ、カ、ル事態ヨリ列國ノ蒙ル損害ノ賠償ヲ要求

スル時ハ、不幸ニシテ常ニ非常ナ困難ニ遭遇シマシタ。

實際中國ニオケル列強ノ權益ガ打撃ヲ蒙リ或ハ脅カサレタ場合イツデ
モ列強ハ自力ニヨル手段ニ頼ルトイフコトガ習慣デアリマシタ。中國
ノ最近ノ歴史ニハソノヨウナ例ガ多クアリマス。即チ諸外國ハ彼ラノ
權益ニ對スル損害ノ賠償ヤ隠防ヲ自己ノ責任ニオイテ實行シテ來マシ
タ

四 日本ハ中國ト歴史的ニモ地理的ニモ他國ヨリ密接ナ關係ガアリ、ソノ
中國ニオケル權益ハ他ノイヅレノ國ヨリモ遙カニ大キク、故ニ前述ノ
如キ中國内ノ不安狀態ヨリ屢々打撃モ他國ヨリヅツト甚大ナモノデア
リマシタ。日本ニ關スル限り、當然日本ハ中國ガ再生シ極東平和維持
ニオケル中國ノ眞ノ役割ヲ悟ルヤウニト希望シマシタ。二十年以上ノ
間特ニ華府會議以來我々ハ多大ノ忍耐ト克己ヲ行ツテ來タガ中國ニオ
ケル諸狀況ハ少シモ改善ノ迹ヲミセズ、却ツテ尙ニ悪化シテ來マシタ
日本ノ最前線デアルトコロノ滿洲、我々ガ國運ヲ賭シテ中國及「ロシ
ヤ」ノ侵略ヲ撃退スルタメニソコデ二回ニワタリ大戰爭ヲナシ又亞細

亞大陸ニオケル我ガ致命的利害ノ中心トナツテキル滿洲ニ於テ、九月十八日ノ突發事件ガ起ツタノハ中國ノ愈々增長スル煽動ニ對シテ我國民ノ感情ガ高マツテ來タ時デアリマシタ。我々ハ斷乎トシテ自衛ノ手段ヲトル他ニ方法ガナカツタノデアリマス。

五 日本ノ行動ノ結果トシテ張學良將軍ノ權力ハ消滅シマシタ。張一門ノ批政ノ下デ長イ間焦躁シ、長城以南ノ中國動亂ニ滿洲國ヲ曳キ込マウトスル彼等ノ政策ニ反對シテキタ有力ナ滿洲人達ハ獨立國家樹立ノ機會ヲ掘ンダノデアリマス。

滿洲ハ地理的ニモ又民族心理的特性カライツテモ中國本土トハ全ク別個ノ國デアリマス。人民ハ大部分中國人カラ出タモノデアリマスガ多クハ飢餓ヤ洪水又專制ヤ壓迫ノタメニ中國本土ノ故郷カラ追出サレテ、日本ノ保護ト經營ノ下ニ比較的ニ安全ト富裕ヲ樂シム事ノデキル國土デ新生活ヲ建設スルタメニ逃げテ來タ中國人デアリマス。ソノ上歴史的ニ見テモ滿洲ハ中國ニトツテ純粹ニ不可分ナ要素ヲ成シタコトハアリマセン。特ニコノ數十年間ニ無數ノ場合ニ示サレタヨウニ中國ノイカナル政府ノ權力モ滿洲ニマデ及シダコトハアリマセン。